Redigerer Ansvar for holocaust (avsnitt)

== Referanser ==
<references>

<ref name="Beorn">Beorn, W. W. (2017). [https://doi.org/10.1093/gerhis/ghx030 The Making of an SS Killer: The Life of Colonel Alfred Filbert, 1905–1990]. ''German History,'' Volume 35, Issue 4, Pages 666–668.</ref>

<ref name="Blatman">Blatman, Daniel: ''The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide.'' Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press. 2011</ref>

<ref name="Boyd">Boyd, K. (Ed.). (1999). ''Encyclopedia of historians and historical writing'' (Vol. 1). Taylor & Francis.</ref>

<ref name="Breitman">Breitman, R. (1991). [https://doi.org/10.1177/002200949102600305 Himmler and the'Terrible Secret'among the Executioners]. ''Journal of Contemporary History'', 26(3), 431-451.</ref>

<ref name="Browning1994">{{Kilde artikkel|tittel=The Nazi Decision to Commit Mass Murder: Three Interpretations: The Euphoria of Victory and the Final Solution: Summer-Fall 1941|publikasjon=German Studies Review|doi=10.2307/1431894|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/1431894|dato=1994|fornavn=Christopher R.|etternavn=Browning|serie=3|bind=17|sider=473–481|issn=0149-7952|besøksdato=2019-11-18}}</ref>

<ref name="Earl2016">Earl, H. (2016). Legacies of the Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial After 70 Years. ''Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review'', 39(1):95-115.</ref>

<ref name="Feingold">{{Kilde artikkel|tittel=Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (review)|publikasjon=American Jewish History|doi=10.1353/ajh.2000.0009|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/537|dato=2000-03-01|forfattere=|fornavn=Henry L.|etternavn=Feingold|via=|serie=1|språk=en|bind=88|hefte=|sider=133–135|issn=1086-3141|besøksdato=2019-11-18|sitat=The critical questions about the Holocaust witness role of the United States and Britain concerns what they knew and when they knew it. Official Secrets takes us a long way in providing an answer. In short, it is this: the British government and, to a lesser extent, the Roosevelt administration knew almost everything, and they knew it comparatively early. We learn that the British talent for cryptography allowed them, a few weeks after the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, to decode much of the communication of the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei), those local police units who, together with the SS- trained Einzatsgruppen, did much of the actual killing behind German lines. The decodes, which came into Breitman's hands fortuitously, shed new light on old problems, but at the same time they raise new questions. Why, for example, was no effort made to inform Jews of the fate that awaited them if they fell into Nazi hands? Such an information strategy was possible without compromising the secret of the decrypted codes. Why were the decodes shared with Moscow but not with the U.S.? Why was the information about the officials involved in the killing not used in the post-war denazification procedure and as evidence in the war-crimes trials?}}</ref>

<ref name="Gerlach1998">{{Kilde artikkel|tittel=The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler's Decision in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews|publikasjon=The Journal of Modern History|doi=10.1086/235167|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/235167|dato=1998|fornavn=Christian|etternavn=Gerlach|serie=4|bind=70|sider=759–812|issn=0022-2801|besøksdato=2019-11-18}}</ref>

<ref name="Goda">Goda, N. J. (2006). [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2006.9641113 Law, Memory, and History in the Trials of Nazis]. ''The International History Review,'' 28(4), 798-806.</ref>
<ref name="Grant">{{Kilde bok | forfatter = Grant, R.G. | utgivelsesår = 1999 | tittel = Holocaust | isbn = 8278880521 | utgivelsessted = Oslo | forlag = Libretto forl | url = http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2010042103026 | side = }}</ref>

<ref name="Kay">{{Kilde artikkel|tittel=Transition to Genocide, July 1941: Einsatzkommando 9 and the Annihilation of Soviet Jewry|publikasjon=Holocaust and Genocide Studies|doi=10.1093/hgs/dct048|url=https://academic.oup.com/hgs/article/27/3/411/766645|dato=2013-12-01|fornavn=Alex J.|etternavn=Kay|serie=3|språk=en|bind=27|sider=411–442|issn=8756-6583|besøksdato=2019-11-18}}</ref>

<ref name="Koch">Koch, H. W. (1983). Hitler's ‘Programme’and the Genesis of Operation ‘Barbarossa’. ''The Historical Journal'', 26(4), 891-920.</ref>

<ref name="MacQueen">MacQueen, M. (1998). The context of mass destruction: Agents and prerequisites of the Holocaust in Lithuania. ''Holocaust and Genocide Studies'', 12(1), 27-48.</ref>

<ref name="Mason">{{Kilde artikkel|tittel=Implementing the Final Solution: The Ordinary Regulating of the Extraordinary|publikasjon=World Politics|doi=10.2307/2010318|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/implementing-the-final-solution-the-ordinary-regulating-of-the-extraordinary/FBBE98D8BC396160D0ED9239DF90C1EF|dato=1988|fornavn=Henry L.|etternavn=Mason|serie=4|språk=en|bind=40|sider=542–569|issn=1086-3338|besøksdato=2019-11-18}}</ref>

<ref name="Matthaus">Matthäus, J. (2004). Operation Barbarossa and the onset of the Holocaust, June-December 1941. I Christopher R. Browning: ''The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy'', University of Nebraska Press, Lincolcn 244-308.</ref>

<ref name="Poliakov">Poliakov, L. (1949): [https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/eichmann-administrator-of-exterminationthe-definitive-solution-of-the-jewish-problem/ Eichmann. Administrator of Extermination]. ''Commentary'' 8 (1949): 439.</ref>

<ref name="Overy">Overy, R. (2014). “Ordinary men,” extraordinary circumstances: Historians, social psychology, and the Holocaust. ''Journal of Social Issues,'' 70(3), 515-530.</ref>

<ref name="Russell2017">Russell, N. (2017). An important Milgram-Holocaust linkage: formal rationality. ''Canadian Journal of Sociology'', 42(3), 261-292.</ref>

<ref name="Shepherd">Shepherd, B. (2009). The clean Wehrmacht, the war of extermination, and beyond. ''The Historical Journal'', 52(2), 455-473. «The two highest command bodies, the Army High Command (OKH) and Armed Forces High Command (OKW), and many higher-level field formations also, did not just follow the general directions for brutal action with which Hitler provided them; they also initiated brutal measures themselves. The result was a body of directives extensively implicating the Wehrmacht in the worst aspects of the Third Reich's prosecution of the Second World War: the mass death of Soviet prisoners of war; the use of security policy as a tool for escalating the emergence of the Final Solution across occupied Europe; the... »</ref>

<ref name="Snyder2015">{{Kilde avis|tittel=Hitler’s world may not be so far away {{!}} Timothy Snyder|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/hitlers-world-may-not-be-so-far-away|avis=The Guardian|dato=2015-09-16|besøksdato=2019-05-19|issn=0261-3077|språk=en-GB|fornavn=Timothy|etternavn=Snyder|side=|sitat=It was this double assault upon state institutions in the Baltic states and eastern Poland, at first by the Soviet Union and then by Nazi Germany, that created the special field of experimentation where ideas of a Final Solution became the practice of mass murder. The Germans found political allies among antisemites and people who wished to restore statehood or undo the humiliation of national defeat. They found pragmatic allies, and these were likely more numerous, among people who wished to shift the burden of their own prior collaboration with the Soviets upon the Jewish minority. The Germans also found that they themselves, far more than their leaders expected, were capable of shooting Jews in cold blood. Not only the Einsatzgruppen but German police and soldiers killed Jews in huge mass shootings over pits.}}</ref>

<ref name="Voren">Voren, Robert van (2011). ''Undigested past: the Holocaust in Lithuania'' (Vol. 31). Rodopi.</ref>

<ref name="Zukier">{{Kilde artikkel|tittel=Diversity and Design: The “Twisted Road” and the Regional Turn in Holocaust History|publikasjon=Holocaust and Genocide Studies|doi=10.1093/hgs/dct057|url=https://academic.oup.com/hgs/article/27/3/387/766672|dato=2013-12-01|fornavn=Henri|etternavn=Zukier|serie=3|språk=en|bind=27|sider=387–410|issn=8756-6583|besøksdato=2019-11-18|sitat=«The metaphor of the “twisted road” plausibly refuted the then-dominant first-generation intentionalist accounts of a “straight-and-narrow” trajectory of the Holocaust. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, for instance, had written of the “line of antisemitic descent from Martin Luther to Adolf Hitler,” and Gerald Fleming had emphasized that “the line that leads” from Hitler's early antisemitism to the Final Solution was “direct,” with a “striking” and “unbroken” continuity.28 The “twisted road” metaphor, by contrast, suggested that diversity was a process and a major cause of anti-Jewish policies. Most significantly, however, the new trope framed a paradigm of diversity that has tacitly and spuriously informed all sides of the debates on Holocaust intentionality. The metaphor set up a dichotomy between a “twisted” and a “straight-and-narrow” road to the Final Solution.}}</ref>

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