Redigerer Den russisk-ukrainske krisen 2021–2022 (avsnitt)

==== Russiske nasjonalister ====
[[Fil:New_Horizons_International_Conference_04_(cropped).jpg|miniatyr|[[Aleksandr Dugin]] Foto:Tasnim News Agency]]
Forestillingen om en egen distinkt russisk sivilisasjon, et ''[[Russkij Mir]]'' eller ''Russisk Verden'' kan sees som en forlengelse av ideer fra tidlig i 1990-årene om en unik euro-asiatisk russisk sivilisasjon, en retning kjent som [[eurasianisme]], litt senere forbundet med bla nt annet [[Aleksandr Dugin]] og hans bok ''Grunnlag for Geopolitikk: Russlands geopolitiske framtid'' (1997). Dugin hevder at «Ukraina som stat ikke har geopolitisk betydning. Det har ingen spesiell kulturell betydning eller universell betydning, ingen geografisk unikhet, ingen etnisk eksklusivitet». «Ukraina som en uavhengig stat med visse territorielle ambisjoner»,  «representerer en enorm fare for hele Eurasia, og uten å løse det ukrainske problemet, er det generelt meningsløst å snakke om kontinentalpolitikk.»<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20160607175004/https:/www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1/John%20Dunlop%20Aleksandr%20Dugin's%20Foundations%20of%20Geopolitics.pdf Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics] Dunlop, John B Demokratizatsiya 12.1 2004. web.archive.org fra [https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya archive/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1/John Dunlop Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics.pdf original] sitat:On the key question of Ukraine, Dugin underlines: "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural import or universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusiveness" (377). "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions," he warns, "represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics" (348). And he adds that, "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'" (379). However, as we have seen, for Dugin all such "sanitary cordons" are inadmissible. Dugin speculates that three extreme western regions of Ukraine--Volynia, Galicia, and Trans-Carpathia--heavily populated with Uniates and other Catholics, could be permitted to form an independent "Western Ukrainian Federation." But this area must not under any circumstances be permitted to fall under Atlanticist control (382). With the exception of these three western regions, Ukraine, like Belorussia, is seen as an integral part of Eurasia-Russia.</ref> Det er uklart hvilken innflytelse Aleksandr Dugin har i Russland og på Putins nasjonalisme.<ref>[https://providencemag.com/2019/07/west-overestimates-aleksandr-dugins-influence-russia/ The West Overestimates Aleksandr Dugin’s Influence in Russia] providencemag.com George Barros 2019 sitat:Correlation should never be conflated with causation. Many casual Russia observers and armchair Kremlinologists ascribe grand power to the controversial philosopher using speculative evidence based in hearsay. While Dugin does enjoy some publicity in Russia, his personal eccentrics and appearance of influence, coupled with Putin’s aggressive foreign policy, facilitated the plausible narrative in a Western media echo chamber that Dugin is Putin’s strategist. This myth has grown grossly out of proportion. As a result, Dugin is granted far more credibility than deserved. Proponents of the "Dugin the mastermind" argument need to substantiate their claims with evidence and ask themselves how effective, if at all, is Dugin at influencing Kremlin elites and Russian foreign policy.</ref>